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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N. A., 
Defendant-Appellant, 
et aL 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No 
k
 13725 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a dispute regarding ownership of 
certain cattle or proceeds thereof, the cattle having been 
sold pending determination by the Court. Ownership is 
claimed by involuntary defendant J. B. J. FEED-
YARDS, INC., subject to a security interest in favor 
of defendant-appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, N. A. Ownership is also claimed by intervenor-
appellant DON ALLEN, subject to a security interest 
in favor of pkintiff-respondent ZIONS FIRST NATION-
AL BANK. A counterclaim of appellant for costs of 
feeding the disputed animals is operative against respon-
dent if respondent prevails. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial was held before The Honorable George E. 
Ballif, District Judge, in the Fourth Judicial District, 
Utah County. Judgment was granted in favor of inter-
venor-appellant, subject to the security interest of plain-
tiff-respondent, except for a counterclaim of defendant-
appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. 
for the costs of feeding the subject animals prior to their 
sale. Trial was held without a jury. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, N. A. seeks reversal of the judgment granting 
title to the subject animals to intervenor and respon-
dent. Although appellant desires confirmation of the 
validity of its counterclaim for feed costs, if the judg-
ment is reversed, the counterclaim becomes moot because 
appellant is agreeable to absorbing the costs of feeding 
the animals which this Court will then determine to be 
under appellant's valid security interest. In such event,, 
appellant also seeks an order compelling restoration to 
appellant of funds representing certain proceeds of sale 
which were received by respondent from the Clerk of 
the Court. Intervenor-appellant seeks reversal of the 
award on the counterclaim pursuant to a cross^appeal, 
but desires affirmance of the Court's judgment otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Abundant reference to the facts as reflected in the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
record wil; .u . H -sai\, umi- .»I .MI.- statement and in 
the argument, lite transcript of the trial will be referred 
to by page number and, where appropriate, line number, 
in the form "Tr. .... 1. ". The pleadings and 'other docu-
ments in the 'balance of the record will be referred to in 
the Utvni. I. Exhibits will be described according 
te then respective sequential numbers, with an aittempt 
to indicate t». the Court, where appropriate, Exhibits of 
such material it \ a to deserve detailed review by the 
Court. 
Concerning identification of the parties, defendant 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. will be 
termed "appellant" or sometimes "FIRST SECURITY" 
and plaintiff ZIONS FIRST NATIONAI BANK will be 
termed "respondent" or sometimes "ZIONS". Intervenor 
DON ALIJEN will be referred to as "mtervenar" not-
withstanding that said intervenor is a respondent with 
v^w't to FIRST SECURITY'S appeal and is in the 
status of an appellant with regard to his own cross-apt- .*; 
The so-called "involuntary defendants* win he desu>-
natedby name or the use of said rule where appropriate* 
With the most frequent reference to involuntary defen-
dant \ r ' FEEDYAKDS. INC., sometimes called 
!
 1.. J . : convenience, The involuntary defendants 
have no appeal or cross appeal pending 
The rathei complex and iutuirump. amma to be re-
viewed,, by the Court began, to unfold, in approximately 
April, 1972, when various members of the FORD family, 
involuntary defendants, together wi1K U M 1 ! T * M 
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GARTH BOSWELL, commenced a business of purchas-
ing and selling cattle through a corporation known as 
J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC., of which BOSWELL 
was 50% owner and a vice president and director (Tr. 
300 1. 2). The principal business of J. B. J. was centered 
in feed lots and corrals owned by J. B. J. in Goshen, 
Utah. The business was to be financed partly by invest-
ment of the respective parties, but more substantially 
through loans from the Payson, Utah Office of appellant 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N. A. The fol-
lowing obligations to appellant were incurred by J. B. J. 
Principal 
Description Amount Reference 
Promissory Note of 
April 20,1972 $126,200.00 Exhibit 49 
Promissory Note of 
June 7, 1972 $ 39,000.00 Exhibit 50 
Promissory Note of 
July 12, 1972 $ 53,000.00 Exhibit 51 
Overdrafts in various 
amounts 
The initial advance of $126,200.00 was for the pur-
pose of purchasing cattle to go on a feeding program 
of J. B. J. (Tr. 706), the next advance of $39,000.00 was 
for the purpose of paying for part of the ovefrcost of the 
feeder program and to finance purchase of bulls and other 
cattle (Tr. 707) and the advance of $53,000.00 financed 
an increased number of bulls in the bull program (Tr. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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708), J. B. J. provided for the benefit of appellant a 
security agreement covering all of the animals together 
with substitutions, replacements, additions and proceeds 
thereof (Exh. 53, Tr. 710). Financing statements cover-
ing the collateral were duly filed with the Utah Secre-
tary of State between April 20 and April 27, 1972 (Exhs. 
54, 55 and 56, Tr. 713-715). On April 12, 1973, after the 
dispute herein described had become very ripe, an addi-
tional financing statement was filed for the purpose of 
cxmf inning the security interest in the animals here in 
dispute (Exh. 57, Tr. 717). The obligations of J. B. J. 
to appellant were guaranteed by WILLIAM G. BOS-
WELL, JAMES K. FORD, WILLIAM FORD and JO-
SEPH FORD & SONS, a partnership (Exh. 52, Tr. 709). 
Additional security documents and other agreements of 
various kinds pertaining to the J. B. J. financing were 
also taken, including a security agreement on crops (Exh. 
58), a real estate mortgage (Exh. 59), various pledge, 
collateral and subordination agreements (Exhs. 60 
through 67) mid basic corporate authorization resolutions 
(Exhs. 68 and 69). The overdraft obligations arose dur-
ing the course of business in which cattle were in transit 
either for purchase or for sale, requiring some "float" 
in the cash flow of J. B. J. 
MR. BOSWELL was primarily responsible for pur-
chasing and selling the animals beginning in April, 1972. 
No purchases for J. B. J. were made later than January 
25,1973 (Tr. 300 1. 12). Many of the cattle, particularly 
the bulls, were purchased from intervenor DON ALLEN, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
who was doing business in Montana and whose principal 
Utah customer was J. B. J. (Tr. 496 1. 28). During the 
period April, 1972 to January, 1973, J. B. J. purchased 
approximately 3,175 head of cattle and sold or lost ap-
proximately 3,203.5 head which can be accounted for 
(Exh. 74, Tr. 759). The latter figure includes the cattle 
in dispute in this action, which were sold between Feb-
ruary and September, 1973 pursuant to a much disputed 
stipulation and agreement (Exh. 93) and have been metic-
ulously accounted for (Exh. 11). Exhibits 11, 53, 74 and 
93 are critical to this action and deserve careful review 
by this Court. 
Various problems arose in the conduct of the busi-
ness of J. B. J. which gave FIRST SECURITY consider-
able apprehension, including a growing concern over the 
frequent overdrafts and the lack of accounting informa-
tion from J. B. J. (Tr. 733). Consequently, FIRST SE-
CURITY'S principal representative in this matter, Mr. 
Roy Broadbent, made demand on October 6, 1972 for 
payment of the overdraft and liquidation of the bull pro-
gram (Exh. 70, Tr. 736). Thereafter, Mr. Broadbent 
made an inspection of the J. B. J. cattle on December 
6, 1972 and determined that only 584 head were present, 
when the total should have been approximately 819 
(Tr. 733). Earlier inspections had indicated the correct 
number of animals (Tr. 731). Most of the cattle belong-
ing to J. B. J. and held for more than a few days had 
been branded with the J. B. J. brand "(- )" (Tr. 837). 
Also, most of J. B. J. purchases and sales had been 
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handled through checks or drafts drawn or payable 
either at FIRST SECURITY or ZIONS, with proceeds 
of sales represented by deposits to J, B. J.'s accounts 
at one of those two banks (Exh. 74). 
During the middle of December, 1972, some of the 
checks or drafts of J. B. J. were being returned unpaid, 
as a result of which MR. BOSWELL was seeking new 
financing for J. B. J. Two shipments of cattle designated 
for purchase by J. B. J., totaling 74 head and shipped in 
two segments on December 15 and December 20, 1972, 
were shipped by intervenor DON ALLEN in anticipa-
tion that the new financing could pay for them (Tr. 500 
1. 4). When it appeared that payment would not be 
made to intervenor, MR. BOSWELL branded those ani-
mals with a "V5", an unregistered brand, but kept the 
animals in the feed lots maintained by J. B. J. at Goshen, 
Utah (Tr. 382). These animals are among those in dis-
pute. 
On January 1, 1973, intervenor DON ALLEN, to-
gether with his wife, met with MR. BOSWELL and Mr. 
Wallace Gardner at the Spanish Fork Office of ZIONS 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK and formed a new cattle 
trading company to be named MOUNT NEBO CATTLE 
COMPANY (Tr. 472 1. 23). At the same time, a loan 
in the amount of $50,000.00 was obtained from ZIONS 
to help finance the MOUNT NEBO CATTLE business 
(Tr. 476, 561). Thereafter, cattle purchases were made 
in the name of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY 
and copies of invoices reflecting the same were received 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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at ZIONS beginning late January, 1973 (Tr. 573 1. 6). 
MR. BOSWELL was employed as a commission agent 
for MOUNT NEBO on January 1, 1973, confirmed in 
writing on February 14, 1973 (Exh. 24, Tr. 333 1. 14). 
Since MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY had no 
Utah facilities of its own, MR. BOSWELL used the 
same feed lots in Goshen, Utah as were used to feed and 
corral animals belonging to J. B. J. MR. BOSWELL paid 
for recording of the "V5" brand with the appropriate 
state office and began using that brand on the MOUNT 
NEBO animals (Tr. 369, 371). 
By January 25, 1973, the FORDS and Mr. Broad-
bant of FIRST SECURITY had become increasingly 
concerned about the security and identity of J. B. J.'s 
animals in the Goshen yards. On that date, approxi-
mately 167 animals were taken from the J. B. J. yards 
to a nearby property owned by the FORDS (Tr. 185). 
After further discussion and investigation, the FORDS 
and FIRST SECURITY believed that the remaining ani-
mals at the J. B. J. yards in Goshen were part of the 
J. B. J. animals, subject to the FIRST SECURITY lien. 
Thereafter, FIRST SECURITY instituted a lawsuit 
against J. B. J. and the guarantors, Civil No. 38191, 
Fourth Judicial District, Utah County, and on Febru-
ary 7, 1973 a Writ of Attachment was issued pursuant 
to which an additional 267 head of animals were taken 
by the sheriff from the Goshen yards of J. B. J. and 
quartered temporarily at the Lazy S Cattle Ranch in 
Elberba, Utah (Tr. 202, Exh. 23). During subsequent 
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hearings on motions to quash the Writ, the intervener 
DON ALLEN appeared and asserted a claim to the 
animals. Counsel for the parties thereafter stipulated 
that the cattle should be sold and fee proceeds held for 
disposition by the Court (Exh. 93). The 267 head thus 
attached, with adjustments for deaths, new births and 
other claims are the animals here in dispute. The writ 
of atitachment in the other action was dissolved alter 
some of the attached animals were sold by MR. BOS-
WELL as agent for MR. ALLEN. Fallowing disputes 
concerning affectiveness of the stipulation, FIRST SE-
CURITY arranged the remaining sales and all proceeds 
were accounted for (Exh. 11). 
The lawsuit from which this appeal arises was com-
menced by ZIONS after the stipulation in the prior 
action was entered into, the claim of ZIONS not having 
been asserted previously. Motions to consolidate were 
denied by the respective judges handling both cases and 
this case proceeded to trial solely on the issue of title to 
the animals and security interests applicable thereto and 
FIRST SECURITY'S counterclaim for costs of feeding 
the animals. No issues pertaining to damages from the at-
tachment or otherwise were reserved or tried in the lower 
court in this action, but remain in the other action for sub-
sequent trial unless this Court renders most of such claims 
moot. 
On the morning of the 8th day following entry of 
judgment herein and within an hour before the notice 
of appeal and supersedeas bond were filed with the lower 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court, counsel for initervenor obtained an order requiring 
the Clerk of Court to turn over that portion of the pro-
ceeds of sale which had been deposited with the Clerk, 
amounting to $34,127.18. Counsel for appellant agreed 
not to contest such highly irregular procedure on the 
gentlemen's understanding, not made part of the record, 
that such funds would be paid to and applied by ZIONS 
toward the note of intervenor and that ZIONS would 
restore the funds for the benefit of appellant if this Court 
should reverse the existing judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OWNERSHIP OF J. B. J. FEED YARDS, 
INC. EXTENDED TO, AND THE SECURITY 
INTEREST OF FIRST SECURITY BANK 
ATTACHED TO AND WAS PERFECTED IN 
THE ANIMALS IN DISPUTE AS CATTLE 
ORIGINALLY HELD BY J. B. J. OR SUBSTI-
TUTIONS, REPLACEMENTS, ADDITIONS 
OR PROCEEDS THEREOF. 
(A) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CER-
TAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLU-
SIONS PERTAINING TO TITLE AND 
SECURITY INTERESTS. 
Appellant believes it helpful to the Court to desig-
nate those portions of the Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment which appellant deems materially erroneous. 
Arguments in support of appellant's position are con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tained under the subsequent sub-headings. Appellant 
expressly submits that the following were erroneous: 
Findings of Fact (R. 450): 
1. The finding that the security agreements of ap-
pellant were a "purchase money mortgage for purchasing 
approximately 600 head of feeder cattle," as contrasted 
to the language of the security agreements said the busi-
ness practices of the parties which provide broader se-
curity interests, covering more than just the feeder cattle; 
2. The last statement regarding the "bull program" 
as a rapid turnover program necessitating a 30 day sale, 
which is substantially correct, but does not take cog-
nizance of many exceptions in which bulls were retained 
for a longer period; 
* * * 
6. The findings that the practice by which inter-
venor sold animals to J. B. J. was on a "C. O. D." basis, 
and that intervenor ALLEN "expressly retained title 
to said cattle until he was paid for them by J. B. J. 
FEEDYARDS, INC."; 
7. The misleading statement which suggests that 
the inability of J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC. to pay 
intervenor in November and December, 1972 was solely 
the result of termination of the financing arrangements 
with FIRST SECURITY BANK, and the characteriza-
tion of any shipment as "C. 0. D."; 
8. The critical findings that the December 15 and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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December 20, 1972 loads were "rejected" by J. B. J., 
that intervenor ALLEN directed MR. BOSWELL to 
brand the animals "V5" or to hold the loads for inter-
venor, and that BOSWELL received said two loads of 
animals for intervenor ALLEN and not for J. B. J.; 
* * # 
11. The suggestion that intervenor ALLEN did not 
ship cattle in January, 1973 for the account of J. B. J. 
FEEDYARDS, INC. as distinguished from MOUNT 
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY, and that the loads of 
December 15 and December 20, 1972 were part of the 
MOUNT NEBO cattle; 
12. The finding which incorrectly characterizes the 
financing statement of ZIONS and what it shows regard-
ing MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY and DON 
ALLEN and his wife (Compare Exh. 1) ; 
13. The declaration that J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, 
INC. did not "give value" for the cattle, and that only 
the animals branded "(- )" belong to J. B. J. FEED-
YARDS, INC.; 
• * * 
20. The finding that the animals described therein 
were recognized by intervenor as animals "belonging to 
him/' and the implications of ownership by such pur-
ported recognition. 
Conclusions (R. 46f) 
1. The conclusion that intervenor established his 
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ownership of the animals set forth in Findings 15, 16, 
18, 19, 20, 21 and 22, thus rendering erroneous the fur-
ther conclusion as to intervener's right to deposited 
monies; * 
2. The conclusion that defendant FIRST SECUR-
ITY BANK failed to establish any interest in the animals 
or proceeds designated in Findings 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21 
and 22; 
3. The conclusion that intervenor had rights in the 
animals set forth in Conclusion No. 1, and that plaintiff 
ZIONS BANK had a security interest therein. 
* * * 
Judgment (JR. 470) 
Without enumerating again the various paragraph 
numbers, the Court will understand that appellant believes 
the judgment to be incorrect on the same grounds and 
for the same reasons as designated above in references to 
the Findings and Conclusions. 
(B) APPLICABLE LAW EXTENDS AP-
PELLANT'S SECURITY INTERESTS 
BOTH TO EXISTING AND AFTER-
ACQUIRED PROPERTY AS COLLAT-
ERAL FOR BOTH PRESENT AND FU-
TURE ADVANCES. 
The law applicable is derived primarily from the 
Secured Transactions portion of the Uniform Commercial 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Code, found in Chapter 9 of Title 70A. (Unless other-
wise expressly shown, all statutory refecrenoes herein 
shall be to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended). 
Several features of commercial law representing forward-
looking legal concepts made certain by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code include the attachment of a security inter-
est (lien) to after-acquired property and the validity 
of a security interest as collateral for future advances. 
In addition, certain rules pertaining to passage of title 
were also made more definite, as argued hereinafter. 
Those critical legal concepts, as applied to the facts in 
the record, compel new findings and conclusions in favor 
of appellant. 
The basic security document relied on by appellant 
is the Security Agreement (Farm Products Chattel Mort-
gage) shown as Exhibit 53. That Security Agreement 
was signed by all involuntary defendants, including the 
corporate signature of J. B. J. FEED YARDS, INC. The 
agreement covered various crops, feed and real property 
in addition to cattle. The relevant portions pertaining 
to cattle are: 
" . . . (Debtor) grants to F I R S T SECUR-
I T Y BANK O F U T A H , N A T I O N A L 
ASSOCIATION, Payson, Utah ("Bank") 
a security interest in the following described 
collateral and products and proceeds thereof: 
(a) L I V E S T O C K A N D O T H E R 
C H A T T L E S ; (Also describe the general lo-
1
 cation thereof) This is a purchase money mort-
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gage for purchasing approximately 600 head 
of feeder cattle and five months of summer 
grazing on the ground of King Creek Grazing 
Association, Bancroft, Idaho, plus feeds, sup-
pliments (sic), etc. Specific description will 
be reported by photo copies attached to this 
mortgage of purchase drafts, sales slips, or 
other purchase evidence, but the cattle will be 
mainly described in the following three groups: 
1. 200 head of Holstein feeder steers, ap-
proximately 600 lbs. when bought. 
2. 200 head of choice quality Hereford 
Angus and mixed beef heifers, about 600 lbs. 
when bought. 
3. 200 head of choice quality Hereford 
Angus and mixed beef steers, about 600 lbs. 
when bought. 
Together with any additions, replacements, or 
substitutions during the life of this mortgage" 
* * * 
"The distinguishing brands or marks on any 
livestock described are: 
[(-) on right side] 
"The security interest shall extend to all 
generations of increase of the above described 
collateral and all additions and accessions 
thereto, together with all additional property 
of similar nature or any interest therein now 
owned or hereafter acquired by Debtor, wheth-
er or not enumerated and whether branded or 
unbranded with the marks indicated and 
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whether or not said brands or marks are in the 
position or location shown above." 
* * * 
"2. O B L I G A T I O N S S E C U R E D : 
The security interest herein granted is given to 
secure the payment and performance of the 
following described obligations: 
Principal Date of 
Amount Notes Terms of Payment 
$126,200.00 4/20/72 Payable on or be-
fore ten months 
from date. 
(b) O T H E R O B L I G A T I O N S : To 
secure payment of all principal and interest 
of such other advances as Bank, in its sole 
discretion, may make to Debtor up to an aggre-
gate outstanding balance at any one time of 
$ , or if no sum is designated a 
maximum of THREE TIMES the original 
advance by Bank in connection with this agree-
ment; provided, however, that the making of 
any further loans, advances or expenditures 
shall be optional with Bank, and nothing here-
in shall be construed to obligate Bank for any 
such purposes; to secure payment of all other 
obligations of Debtor to Bank or assignee of 
Bank howerer evidenced, created or arising, 
whether absolute or contingent, whether con-
tracted directly or indirectly, and whether or 
not due; and all modifications or renewals of 
any obligations secured hereby." (emphasis 
supplied) 
Appellant must here observe that the basic legal 
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effect of the security agreement is not here in issue. The 
question for this Court to determine from the evidence 
is whether or not the concept of extending a security 
interest to additions, replacements or substitutions of 
the designated cattle carries the security interest of 
FIRST SECURITY to the M head of cattle here at 
issue. The basic proposition is: if the cattle in dispute 
can be shown to represent cattle belonging to J. B. J., 
whenever purchased subsequent to April 20, 1972, then 
the security interest of FIRST SECURITY under Ex-
hibit 51 automatically and as a matter of law extends to 
all such cattle. A further basic proposition is that all 
such cattle secure not only the original promissory note 
of $126,200.00, but also any additional advances made 
by the BANK to or for the benefit of J. B. J., and that 
such other obligations secured include the two additional 
promissory notes and the overdraft designated in the 
Statement of Facts above. 
Appellant must further observe preliminarily that the 
issues here do not involve conflicting security interests 
in the same collateral determined from priorities of filing 
or otherwise under §70A-9-312. If J. B. J. and FIRST 
SECURITY can sustain their claim to the cattle in issue 
by reason of the additions, replacements, substitutions 
and proceeds concept, then the cattle do not belong to 
intervener and are not subject to any security interest 
held by ZIONS. Conversely, if the lower court were cor-
rect in its determinations, then FIRST SECURITY would 
have no interest in the cattle at issue. The contest, there-
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fore, is not based on whether FIRST SECURITY or 
ZIONS effected a financing statement filing first, but 
rather which bank has any claim at all in the subject ani-
mals. The same debtor has not granted security interests 
in the same collateral to more than one secured party. 
Rather, the Court determines which debtor owned the 
cattle and therefore which bank had a security interest 
therein. 
The evidence is uncontroverted that FIRST SECUR-
ITY advanced to or for the benefit of J. B. J. sums total-
ing $218,200.00 on three promissory notes (Exhs. 49, 50 
and 51), together with overdrafts in varying amounts and 
standing at $14,688.44 just prior to the payments of the 
overdrafts. The promissory notes had on January 21,1974, 
the first date of trial, an aggregate balance of principal 
and accrued interest of $116,700.53 (Tr. 877-879). Those 
advances constituted new value secured by cattle then 
existing or thereafter acquired. Additional purchases were 
made by J. B. J. in the ordinary course of business and 
all of the cattle purchased thus came under the "floating 
lien" held by FIRST SECURITY attaching to all cattle 
held or subsequently acquired by J. B. J. 
The rather steady stream of purchases and sales by 
or for the account of J. B. J. is graphically illustrated in 
Exhibit 74. Based on the regular books of account together 
with other documents supporting that exhibit, it is evident 
that J. B. J. purchased a total of 3,175 head for a total of 
$1,234,319.75. Those facts render operable the provisions 
of §70A-9-108: 
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"Where a secured party makes an ed-
vance, incurs an obligation, releases a perfected 
security interest, or otherwise gives new value 
which is to be secured in whole or in part by 
after-acquired property his security interest 
in the after-acquired collateral shall be deemed 
to be taken for new value and not as security 
for an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires 
his rights in such collateral either in the ordi-
nary course of his business or under a contract 
of purchase made pursuant to the security 
agreement within a reasonable time after new 
value is given." 
The security interest of FIRST SECURITY attached 
to the cattle and became immediately perfected because 
(1) the BANK had given value (cash advances from the 
promissory notes and overdrafts; (2) a security agreement 
existed indicating that the security interest would attach 
to subsequently acquired cattle; and (3) J. B. J., as debtor, 
obtained rights to the collateral as soon at the various 
loads of cattle were loaded at the seller's place of shipment 
and designated for J. B. J., or at the very least, when the 
cattle were received at the feed lot of J. B. J. in Goshen, 
Utah. 
The agreement between FIRST SECURITY and 
J. B. J. contemplating expressly that after-acquired cattle 
would be covered also declared that such cattle would 
secure future advances whether or not such advances were 
made pursuant to a commitment. The operation of §70A-
9-204 is clearly effective in this case: 
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"(1) A security interest cannot attach 
until there is agreement . . . that it attach and 
value is given and the debtor has rights in the 
collateral. I t attaches as soon as all of the 
events in the preceding sentence have taken 
place unless explicit agreement postpones the 
time of attaching." 
* * * 
"(3) Except as provided in subsection 
(4) a security agreement may provide that 
collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all 
obligations covered by the security agreement." 
* * * 
s "(5) Obligations covered by a security 
agreement may include future advances or 
other value whether or not the advances or 
value are given pursuant to commitment." 
Because the cattle or products thereof (including 
newborn) were held by J. B. J. as a debtor engaged in 
raising, fattening, grazing or other farming operations, the 
cattle are deemed "farm products" under the provisions 
of §7QA-9-109: 
"(3) 'farm products' if they are crops 
or livestock or supplies used or produced in 
farming operations or if they are products of 
crops or livestock in their unmanufactured 
states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple 
syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in the 
possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fat-
tening, grazing or other farming operations. 
If goods are farm products, they are neither 
equipment nor inventory;" 
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Appellant here submits that it met by convincing 
and preponderant evidence its burden of proof in tracing 
animals of J. B. J. through their various purchases and 
sales, including the animals in dispute, which are sumsmar-
izde as item 6 on the sales column of Exhibit 74. The speci-
fic sales thereof are further detailed in Exhibit 11. Those 
exhibits convincingly demonstrate the operation of the 
substitutions, replacements, additions and proceeds con-
cept. The concept is further supported by the fundamental 
rule under the Uniform Commercial Code that the security 
interest "attached", meaning that all J. B. J.'s interests 
in the continuing stream of cattle purchases became sub-
ject to the lien of FIRST SECURITY, and contempor-
aneously, the lien or security interest became "perfected" 
by reason of the prior filing of the financing statement 
with the Secretary of State, rendering the security interest 
invulnerable to any other creditors or purchasers of J. B. J. 
§70A-9-303(l) declares: 
"A security interest is perfected when it 
has attached and when all of the applicable 
steps required for perfection have been taken. 
* * * If such steps are taken before the security 
interest attaches, it is perfected at the time 
when it attaches." 
The animals falling within the terms "substitutions," 
"replacements" or "additions" fall under the security agree-
ment irrespective of whether any of the animals are actual-
ly sold. The evidence here amply demonstrates that the 
animals of J. B. J. were sold in the ordinary course of 
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business up through February 8, 1973 and were there-
after sold in order to obtain the money to be held pending 
determination of ownership by the Court. The actual sale 
of animals, as distinguished from purchases or products 
(newborn) brings into operation the additional concept 
of "proceeds". When J. B. J. cattle were sold, the money 
received in payment thereof, or any accounts receivable 
arising for future payment, or any cattle purchased with 
the money derived from sales, would constitute "cash" 
or "noncash" proceeds in which appellant's security in-
terest would continue on a perfected basis. The legal effect 
occurs both by reason of the security agreement provisions 
cited above as well as the following operative provisions 
of §70A-9-306: 
"(1) 'Proceeds' includes whatever is re-
ceived when collateral or proceeds is sold, ex-
changed, collected or otherwise disposed of. 
The term also includes the account arising when 
the right to payment is earned under a contract 
right. Money, checks and the like are 'cash 
proceeds.' All other proceeds are 'noncash 
proceeds.' 
"(2) Except where this chapter other-
wise provides, a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or 
other disposition thereof by the debtor unless 
his action was authorized by the secured party 
in a security agreement or otherwise, and also 
continues in any identifiable proceeds includ-
ing collections received by the debtor. 
"(3) The security interest in proceeds 
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is a continuously perfected security interest 
if the interest in the original collateral was per-
fected but it ceases to be a perfected security 
interest and becomes unperfected ten days 
after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor un-
less 
(a) a filed financial statement covering 
the original collateral also covers proceeds; 
The "proceeds" concept harmonizes well with the 
previously expressed notions pertaining to afternacquired 
property through substitutions, replacements and addi-
tions. The right to follow the proceeds is further confirmed 
by §70A-9-307(l) Which denies a purchaser any bona fide 
purchaser position and makes him subject to the lien: 
A buyer in ordinary course of business 
(subsection (9) of § 70A-1-201) other than 
a person buying farm products from a person 
engaged in farming operations takes free of a 
security interest created by his seller even 
though the security interest is perfected and 
even though the buyer knows of its existence." 
It is further observed that the Uniform Commercial 
Oode is specifically designed to permit the "floating lien" 
on inventory such as the cattle inventory demonstrated in 
this case, and that the security interest is not lost, either 
by the abundant purchase and sale toansactions or by the 
intermingling or commingling of cash or non-cash proceeds 
arising from sales. §7GA-9-205 states in pertinent part: 
"A security interest is not invalid or 
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fraudulent against creditors by reason of 
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle or dis-
pose of all or part of the collateral (including 
returned or repossessed goods) or to collect or 
compromise accounts, contracts rights or chat-
tel paper, or to accept the return of goods or 
make repossessions, or to use, commingle or 
dispose of proceeds or by reason of the failure 
of the secured party to require the debtor to 
account for proceeds or replace collateral. * * * 
The right of the bank to follow through the "proceeds" 
of cattle on which it has a security interest is demonstrated 
in Baker Production Credit Assn. v. Lang Creek Meat Co., 
Inc., et al., and First State Bank of Oregon (Sept. 1973 
Ore. Sup. Ct.) 513 P.2d 1129. The Court upheld the claim 
of the cattle feeder's finanoer (in the position of FIRST 
SECURITY here) for proceeds as against the financer of 
the slaughter house, stating with reference to the equiva-
lent of 70A-9-306 and 70A-9-307 (1): 
The code, as to farm products, allows the 
security interest to follow the collateral 
through a succession of purchases. See Garden 
City Production Credit Assn. v. Lannan, 186 
Neb. 688, 186 NW2d 99 (1971). (t*r*, € t H3%> 
In Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 50 Wis.2d 270, 
184 NW2d 122 (1971), the Court expressly declared that 
the financing bank did not waive its security interest in 
cattle by allowing its borrower to sell, commingle and other-
wise dispose of cattle. Moreover, the Court uptheld the 
rights of the bank to cattle obtained through an after-
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acquired property clause under its prior perfected security 
inteorest, as against the claims of the seller, Strauss, who 
had not filed: 
We think Strauss did not perfect his se-
curity interest by filing the collateral sales notes 
and is not entitled to the priority protection of 
§ 409.312 (4), Stats., against the after-acquired 
clause of the bank's security instrument. To 
perfect a purchase money security interest, 
§ 409.302(1), Stats., requires the filing of a 
financing statement. (184 NW2d, 125, 126) 
This Court has previously determined that the pro-
visions of the Uniform Commercial Code (Title 70A), 
Chapter 9, Secured Transactions, prevail over the live-
stock Brand and Anti-Theft Act, § 4-13-1, et seq., in estab-
lishing the procedures for perfecting a security interest 
in livestock. Thus, a perfected security interest of a bank 
which financed the cattle purchase prevailed over the as-
serted rights under the branding statutes of a conditional 
vendor. Wilson, et al. v. Burrows, et aL, 27 Ut.2d 436, 497 
P.2d 240 (1972). That case is also helpful in that it effec-
tively overrules Pugh v. Stratton, 22 Ut.2d 190, 450 P.2d 
463 (1969), which had relied on a misinterpretation of 
when the title passes to the buyer as the basis for reaching 
a contrary result. It was made clear in the Wilson case that 
if the purchaser obtained rights in the collateral through 
a contract and possession, and the purchaser's bank has 
a prior perfected security interest, title passes and the lien 
attaches to cut off the rights of the vendor. That is pre-
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cisely the case at bar, for intervenor's rights in the cattle 
were terminated when the shipments were segregated for 
and shipped to J. B. J. pursuant to agreement. The prob-
lems of the Wilson case obtained a further legal dimension, 
for in a subsequent appeal involving most of the same 
parties and a related transaction, the Court expressly de-
termined that since the cattle vendors did not file a financ-
ing statement or otherwise perfect a security interest, the 
vendors lost all rights to the cattle, title passed to the pur-
chaser and the purchaser's bank had an enforceable secur-
ity interest. Walker Bank v. Burrows, et al., 29 Ut.2d 218, 
507 P.2d 384 (1973). Questions of passage of title are dis-
cussed more fully under the next sub-heading. 
In summary of the foregoing arguments, we urge the 
Court's consideration of the following: 
(a) The cattle here at issue, not being thorough-
breds requiring genealogical records, cannot be traced in-
dividually, but must be considered in groups delineated 
by the various shipments of purchases and sales of which 
J. B. J. and DON ALLEN had record. 
(b) The most definitive evidence before the Court 
is summarized in Exhibit 74 and explained by the testi-
mony of RoyBroadbent (Tr. 759-831) and the supporting 
exhibits (Exh. 75-84). The recapitulation of Exhibit 74 
draws together all of the documentary records of J. B. J. 
and DON ALLEN together with certain testimony and 
demonstrates the results of the entire history of J. B. J.'s 
business. The animals in dispute are included within that 
tracing of animals to J. B. J. and the security interest of 
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FIRST SECURITY. A slight discrepancy of 28.5 head 
appears in balancing purchases against sales, not a sur-
prising figure (less than 1% error) in view of the imperfect 
records of J. B. J. and DON ALLEN and the total volume 
of around 3,200 head. 
(c) As to most of the animals, no legal issue of pas-
sage of title exists, thus enhancing the credibility of exhi-
bit 74 
(d) With minor possible and arguable exceptions, 
no evidence whatever appears in the record which would 
trace the animals described in Exhibit 74, including the 
267 head in dispute, to any ownership of intervener or to 
any security interest of ZIONS. 
(C) TITLE TO CATTLE DELIVERED TO 
THE PROPERTIES OF J. B. J. FEED-
YARDS, INC. PASSED TO J. B. J. AND 
BECAME IMMEDIATELY SUBJECT 
TO THE LIEN OF APPELLANT. 
The question of passage of title is critical for this Court 
to determine. Intervener in this proceeding attempts to 
claim cattle which were delivered to J. B. J., accepted by 
J. B. J., put in the feed lots by J. B. J., intermingled with 
other cattle of J. B. J. J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY 
assert that the facts evidence a complete passage of title 
to J. B. J. and attachment of the FIRST SECURITY 
lien. The Court here deals with the legal questions by 
which the secured transactions chapter of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, where the metaphysical concept of 
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"title" is immaterial, must be superimposed on the sales 
chapter, where title does become important. Hence, FIRST 
SECURITY could have had a security interest in carbtle 
of J. B. J. irrespective of whether J. B. J. had clear "title" 
or some other kind of interest in the collateral so far as the 
secured transactions chapter is concerned. Fortunately, 
however, the evidence in the record amply demonstrates 
the fact that title in the cattle did exist in J. B. J. and the 
attachment of the security interest of appellant becomes 
more clearly effective for that reason. In construing the 
effect of title, the Court must rely on provisions of §70A-
2-401, quoted in relevant part as follows: 
"(1) Title to goods cannot pass under 
a contract for sale prior to their identification 
to the contract § 70A-2-501), and unless other-
wise explicitly agreed the buyer acquires by 
their identification a special property as limited 
by this act. Any retention or reservation by 
the seller of the title (property) in goods 
shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in 
effect to a reservation of a security interest. 
Subject to these provisions and to the provi-
sions of the chapter on Secured Transactions 
(chapter 9), title to goods passes from the 
seller to the buyer in any manner and on any 
conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties. 
(2) Unless otherwise explicitly agreed 
title passes to the buyer at the time and place 
at which the seller completes his performance 
with reference to the physical delivery of the 
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goods, despite any reservation of a security in-
terest and even though a document of title is 
• • • 
The Wilson and Walker Bank cases, supra, are con-
sistent with the statutory provisions governing passage 
of title and are supportive of appellant's factual and legal 
arguments. Those cases represent this Court's most 
definitive pronouncements on the subject. A very persua-
sive case from another state in point here is North Platte 
State Bank v. Production Credit Association of North 
Platte, 189 Neb. 44, 200 NW2d 1 (1972). The Court sus-
tained the validity of a security interest of the PCA, with 
future advances and after-acquired property, as against 
a bank which had advanced money to the same farmer 
(Tucker) for purchase of specific animals on which it at-
tempted to take a security interest. Tucker had received 
the animals from the seller some 45 days earlier, had not 
paid the seller, but title had passed to Tucker nevertheless 
and the cattle had immediately come under the security 
interest of PCA. The following excerpts are relevant to 
the factual and legal considerations at bar: 
Whatever the parties may have thought, 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code govern, and it is clear that title to the 
cows actually passed to Tucker when they 
reached his ranch and he received the actual 
physical possession of them. 
(Supra at p. 5). 
* * * 
Another bank with a prior perfected security interest 
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prevailed over a seller because of passage of title to the 
bank's customer (buyer) and immediate attachment of 
the security interest, with resulting loss of any legitimate 
claim of the buyer, in First National Bank of Elkhart 
County v. Smoker (Ind. CCA. 1972) 286 NE2d 203. 
Smoker was in essentially the same position as intervenor 
DON ALLEN here and the bank was equivalent to FIRST 
SEOURITY. In reversing a trial court decision in favor 
of Smoker, the Court engaged in a detailed discussion of 
the rationale underlying the Uniform Commercial Code 
provisions quoted above and then concluded: 
Pursuant to the above cited provisions, 
we hold, as a matter of law, that Smoker re-
tained only a purchase money security interest 
in the eighty-five head of cattle upon the de-
livery of such cattle to Whisler under an oral 
contract for sale. To have effectively reserved 
his rights, Smoker would have had to proceed 
under Article 9, § 19-9-101 et seq., concerning 
secured transactions, specifically I.C. 1971, 
26-1-9-312(3); Ind. Ann.St. § 19-9-312(3). 
Since Smoker failed to perfect his security in-
terest in the inventory of Whisler, his rights 
in the enghty-five head of cattle or the proceeds 
thereof are subordinated to the rights of the 
Bank, which had a prior perfected security in-
terest, § 19-9-312(5), and this is true regard-
less of whether Smoker, by explicit agreement, 
retained title to the goods. In Herington Live-
stock Auction Company v. Verschoor, Iowa, 
179 NW2d 491, 495 (1970), it was stated: 
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"Thus for any purposes controlled by ex-
plicit agreement between the parties or by 
provisions of the Act which make passage of 
title a material factor, intent of the parties 
is relevant. But for purposes of determination 
of when an interest becomes a security interest, 
the prior methaphysical concept of title has 
been abandoned and analysis of the steps taken 
by the parties is substituted." (emphasis sup-
plied) lj i^ pr-V &t %{0 
The facts here at issue couldn't have been better 
tailored to fit within the concepts of the above cases. 
Having in mind the principles of law thus established, we 
turn to the specific factual points which this court must 
review. The passage of title question has focused in the 
evidence most expressly around those animals contained 
in the loads dated December 15, 1972 (40 head) and De-
cember 20, 1972 (34 head). The legal principles apply, 
however, to support the claims of J. B. J. and FIRST 
SECURITY to substantially all of the animals listed in 
the purchases column of Exhibit 74, Items 5 through 15. 
No substantial disagreement exists with regard to the pur-
chases listed in Items 1 through 4. The method of operation 
which applies to all of the questioned purchases can be 
most easily seen with reference to the December 15 and 
December 20 loads and discussion will continue with those 
reference points. The Court will find instructive the sum-
mary of J. B. J. FEEDYARDS, INC. cattle purchases 
shown as Exhibit 33. This document was prepared by 
MR. BOSWELL, beginning around January, 1973 and 
continuing for several months (Tr. 424 1. 28). It is ex-
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tremely significant that Exhibit 33 contains the December 
15 and December 20 loads in issue as the final shipments 
on MR. BQSWELL's list. On that exhibit, he noted that 
the prior two shipments of November 29 (32 head) and 
December 12 (33 head) had not been paid for because the 
checks bounced. Although those two loads are not expressly 
in issue as to title, appellant believes them significant for 
the reason that an account receivable was created between 
DON ALLEN and J. B. J. by reason of failure to pay for 
the November 29 and December 12 loads, placing those 
loads in exactly the same position as the next two loads 
of December 15 and December 20. The fact that such 
animals were not paid for is not relevant with regard to 
passage of title, for an obligation to pay arising through 
practice of the parties and actual shipment of animals in-
voiced to J. B. J. gives rise to the obligation to pay, but 
does not deprive the purchaser, J. B. J., of the right to 
dominion over the animals. Although approximately one 
year after preparing Exhibit 33 MR. BOSWELL claimed 
that the loads dated December 15 and December 20 were 
not accepted by J. B. J. (Tr. 425 1. 2), the Court can rely 
more fully on the initial declaration of MR. BOSWELL in 
preparation of Exh. 33 that those two loads were part of 
the J. B. J. purchases. 
The December 15 load is further supported by the 
market clearances and inspection certificates from Mon-
tana contained in Exhibit 39, the five pages of which total 
the 40 head usually described as the December 15 ship-
ment. Those documents clearly show "J. B. J. FEED-
LOT" in Goshen, Utah as the purchaser. A similar demon-
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stration is seen from Exhibit 40, which pertains to the 34 
head contained in the so-called December 20 shipment. 
The livestock market clearances and inspection certifi-
cates together with the trucking invoice shown as part 
of that exhibit evidence "J. B. J. FEEDLOT" or J. B. J. 
FEEDERS" as purchaser in Goshen, Utah. Intervener 
ALLEN consistently described the market clearance cer-
tificates as "Mis of sale" (Tr. 556 1. 20 and 557 1. 20) and 
indicated according to the practice in Montana that these 
documents were used as evidence of ownership for the 
cattle (Tr. 530 1. 30). The presumption naturally arises 
that a sale had taken place from DON ALLEN to J. B. J. 
MR. ALLEN also indicated that he was familiar with Ex-
hibit 33 and that such schedule represented all of the 
cattle purchases of J. B. J. through December 20, 1972 
(Tr. 504 and 505). Up through December 20, he had sold 
four loads to J. B. J. for which he was unpaid, but the 
shipments had been billed to J. B. J. (Tr. 506 11. 8 and 
15). 
As the story concerning those two infamous loads is 
further pieced together, it appears that MR. BOSWELL 
flew to Montana on December 12 and 13, prior to the ship-
ment of the December 15 and December 20 loads (Tr. 459 
1. 11). In the meantime, MR. ALLEN was preparing the 
December 15 load for shipment to J. B. J. (Tr. 468 1.15). 
MR. BOSWELL indicated during discussions while in 
Montana that J. B. J. would be unable to pay for the 
cattle. Accordingly, MR. ALLEN told MR. BOSWELL to 
mark the cattle or in some way keep them separate from 
his cattle and that he would come down later and do 
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somerthing with the livestock, Tr. 469 1. 23). The Decem-
ber 20 load was purchased in Montana, not by MR. AL-
LEN personally, but by order buyers who were employed 
by him for the purpose of rounding up cattle in the various 
cattle markets in Montana, Tr. 471 1. 21). These order 
buyers were working for MR. ALLEN in connection with 
purchase of cattle expressly for shipment to J. B. J., on 
the basis of one to two loads per week (Tr. 499 1.1). Dur-
ing the discussions between MR. BOSWELL and MR. 
ALLEN while MR. BOSWELL was in Montana, MR. 
ALLEN indicated he had another load of cattle for J. B. J. 
and shipped in anticipation that J. B. J. could handle 
them with new financing, which MR. BOSWELL was try-
ing to obtain from Producers Livestock in Salt Lake (Tr. 
499 1. 25 through 500 1. 14). Those cattle were shipped 
with the expectation that they would be purchased by 
J .B . J . (Tr.500 1.18). 
After the two loads arrived in Goshen, Utah within 
a day or two following the December 15 and December 
20 shipments dates, respectively, MR. BOSWELL caused 
the "V5" brand to be placed on those 74 animals (Tr. 383 
1.4). Although the loads were shipped prior to the decision 
that J. B. J. could not pay for them, MR. BOSWELL 
thereafter attempted to say that the two loads were 
"turned down" or "rejected" (Tr. 384 1. 5 and 443 1. 19). 
Appellant strongly submits that the testimony of MR. 
BOSWELL and his actions cannot properly be construed 
by the Court as giving any rise to an inference of retention 
of title in those 74 animals by intervener ALLEN. At the 
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time of the subject transections, MR. BOSWELL was a 
vice president and a director of J. B. J. and never did 
cease being an agent for J. B. J. (Tr. 460 1. 4). The 
"V5" brand was an "open" brand, not designated for the 
use of anyone, but having years earlier been used by MR. 
BOSWELL's family, the Okelberry family (Tr. 382 1. 10 
and 383 1. 26). MR. ALLEN knew nothing about the "V5" 
brand and did not expressly request use of that brand 
until the meeting on January 1, 1973 when MOUNT 
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY was organized (Tr. 472 1.23 
and 475 1. 8 and 508 1. 24). As of January 1, MOUNT 
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY did not own a brand (Tr. 
474 1. 27). At the time the December 15 and December 
20 shipments were made, MR. ALLEN was lead to be-
lieve by MR. BOSWELL that BOSWELL was buying 
out his partners in J. B. J. (Tr. 523 1. 4), knew that 
FIRST SECURITY bad a lien on the cattle (Tr. 524 1. 
14), but his willingness to send those shipments down 
were partly in reliance on the refinancing at Producer's 
Livestock with MR. BOSWELL in control of J. B. J. (Tr. 
5491.20). 
Without belaboring those shipments any further, we 
believe the facts above recited expressly place the Decem-
ber 15 and December 20 shipments under the provisions 
of § 70A-2-401 quoted earlier. The express segregation by 
intervener ALLEN or his agents of the animals at the 
point of shipment for the purpose of selling to J. B. J., 
with bills of sale to J. B. J., together with actual shipment 
and receipt of animals in the J. B. J. yards at Goshen, 
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Utah, all combine to declare unequivocally that the title 
passed to J. B. J. 
Moving briefly to other sales made by DON ALLEN 
to J. B. J. which were questioned at trial by plaintiff and 
intervenor ,the Court can refer easily to the documents 
summarized on Exhibit 74, beginning with Item 5 in the 
purchases column. Without repeating all of the informa-
tion contained on the exhibit, appellant emphasizes that 
each of the entries was supported by further documentary 
evidence which is reliable. Items 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the pur-
chases column are supported by Exhibits 75 through 78. 
The 29 bead shown as Item 9 on September 20, 1972 is 
supported by Exhibit 79. The 32 and 33 head, respective-
ly shown as Items 10 and 11 on the purchases column of 
Exhibit 74 are the loads which were included on MR. 
BOSWELL's summary of J. B. J. purchases, Exhibit 33, 
and indicated as not paid for. These items are further 
supported by Exhibits 80 and 81, respectively. The De-
cember 14 purchase of five head shown as Item 12 in the 
purchases column is further supported by a deposit slip 
made part of Exhibit 80. We have already discussed Items 
13 and 14 of purchases on Exhibit 74, the December 15 
and December 20 loads. The supporting documents, Ex-
hibits 75 through 82, are records which were taken either 
from J. B. J. or from intervenor ALLEN and which form 
sound basis for including those items as J. B. J. purchases. 
Invoices, market clearances and deposit slips which clear-
ly indicate the sale of animals can be relied upon. The 
supplemental records consisting of the invoices, desposit 
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slips and market clearances above referred to were not re-
corded in the bank accounts of J. B. J., but nevertheless 
come from appropriate and ordinary business records. Ad-
mittedly, some effort was made by witness GILBERT, 
called by opposing parties, to show certain duplications 
in the purchases column of Exhibit 74. Appelant here 
submits that the dates, weights, number of animals and 
other particulars on documents referred to by MR. GIL-
BERT were sufficiently different to raise the presump-
tion that his documents reflected other transactions. He 
consistenly admitted that the records of J. B. J. were in-
complete, that he had to get a lot of information orally 
from MR. BOSWELL, and that transactions existed per-
taining to the business of J. B. J. which were not reflected 
in the bank accounts (Tr. 963 1. 27, 964 1. 25, 966 1. 29 
972 1. 22, 998 1. 29 and 1003 1. 12). 
D. THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMIN-
ING THAT INTERVENOR ALLEN EX-
PRESSLY RESERVED A SECURITY 
INTEREST IN CATTLE SOLD. 
Two of the more glaring errors in the Findings of 
Fact are the statements in Finding No. 6 that cattle were 
shipped on a C.O.D. basis and that MR. ALLEN express-
ly retained title to the cattle. Such findings are wholly 
contrary to all of the reliable evidence. The record con-
tains not one shred of evidence that any of the shipments 
from intervener ALLEN to J. B. J. required cash on de-
livery at the time the shipments were received in Goshen, 
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Utah or elsewhere. There is some testimony of the 
'
fC.O.D. basis", but the simple statement is not supported 
by other evidence and is wholly comtrary to the remaining 
evidence. As rather pointed examples, the two loads 
shipped November 29 and December 12,1972, not disputed 
as J. B. J. animals, were not paid for, according to MR. 
BOSWELL (Tr. 427 1. 19). The whole pattern of dealing 
as explained generally by all of the witnesses consisted 
of J. B. J.'s ordering and receiving loads of cattle from 
DON ALLEN and others, sometimes pursuant to specific 
order and sometimes on a regular basis pursuant to prac-
tice. Upon receipt of the invoices, payment was made by 
check or draft. 
Two alternative methods appear in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code for reservation of a security interest by a 
seller. Under § 70A-9-2G3, a security interest is not en-
forceable against the debtor unless the collateral is in the 
possession of the secured party or the debtor has signed 
a security agreement which contains a description of the 
collateral and the intent to grant a security interest. Evi-
dently, intervenor ALLEN made no attempt in any trans-
action whatever to obtain a written security agreement 
Also, he did not attempt to maintain possession of the col-
lateral, but rather shipped it for the purpose of selling 
the same to J. B. J. An alternative method of maintaining 
a security interest arises under the sales chapter of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. The sales would ordinarily 
be subject to the secured transactions chapter requiring 
the formalities immediately above mentioned, except 
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under certain conditions. Section 70A-9-113 reads as fol-
lows: 
"A security interest arising solely under 
the chapter on Sales (chapter 2) is subject to 
the provisions of this chapter except that to the 
extent that and so long as the debtor does not 
have or does not lawfully obtain possession of 
the goods 
(a) No security agreement is necessary to 
make the security interest enforceable; and 
(b) no filing is required to protect the 
security interest; and 
(c) the rights of the secured party on 
default by the debtor are governed by the chap-
ter on Sales (chapter 2) ." (emphasis added) 
Under the facts contained in this record the security 
interest under the Sales Chapter could not arise because 
the debtor, J. B. J. had lawful possession of the goods. 
The exclusions to the formalities cannot apply in such 
event, thus rendering it necessary for intervenor ALLEN 
to have a security agreement and to perfect the same by 
filing a financing statement in order to preserve his secur-
ity interest. 
Construction and application of § 70A-9-113 is further 
confirmed by reference to the Sales Chapter. The unpaid 
seller's remedies include the right to reclaim goods upon 
demand made within ten days after the buyer receives 
the goods while insolvent (§ 70A-2-702), the right to with-
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hold delivery of the goods (§ 70A-2-703), and the right 
to stop delivery while in transit (§ 70A-2-705). Since the 
evidence, or lack of evidence, if the Court pleases, demon-
strates that intervener ALLEN failed to comply with any 
of the formalities necessary for reservation of the seller's 
security interest, title to the cattle passed to J. B. J. for 
the purchases in dispute when the animals were segregated 
by DON ALLEN or his agents and identified to the con-
tract for shipment to J. B. J. or at the very latest, when 
the cattle were delivered, unloaded and received by agents 
of J. B. J. (See references above to MR. ALLEN's testi-
mony confirming that the market clearance certificates 
represented bills of sale). 
II. USE OF THE "V5" BRAND CREATES ONLY 
A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF OWN-
ERSHIP. 
Throughout the trial and argument in the lower court, 
intervenor and respondent consistently relied on presence 
of the "V5" brand on certain animals as evidence of own-
ership. The question comes into sharp focus with reference 
to the 74 head of cattle comprising the December 15 and 
December 20 loads discussed above, all of which animals 
were branded "V5" shortly after arrival, but before any-
one other than J. B. J. claimed ownership of the animals. 
Based both on the law and the facts, appellant submits 
that use of the "V5" brand created, at best a rebuttable 
presumption of ownership. 
Section 4-13-11 reads as follows: 
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"The certified copy of recordation thus 
secured in the foregoing section shall be prima 
facie evidence of the ownership of such ani-
mals or animals by the party whose brand and 
mark it might be and shall be taken as evidence 
of ownership in all courts of law or equity or 
in any criminal proceedings when the title to 
the animals is involved or property to be 
proved." 
The key tegal concept is the term "prima facie." In Black's 
Law Dictionary prima facie is defined: 
At first sight; on the first appearance; on the 
face of it; so far as can be judged from the 
first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed 
to be true unless disproved by some evidence 
to the contrary. 
Prima facie evidence is defined: 
Evidence good and sufficient on its face; such 
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is 
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group 
or chain of facts constituting the party's claim 
or defense, and which if not rebutted or con-
tradicted, will remain sufficient. 
The record is repleat with facts which serve to rebut 
any presumpition of ownership of cattle branded "V5". 
One of intervenor's principal witnesses on the question of 
branding and ownership was a Utah State Brand Inspec-
tor, Myles Roach. Brief reference may be made to Ex-
hibit 5, constituting Mr. Roach's brand certificate book, 
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and certificates numbered 11157, 11182, 11184 and 11186 
contained therein. Each of those certificates showed 
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY as owner of the 
cattle inspected. Most of the animals on those certifi-
cates were branded "V5", but at least three animals had 
either no brand or unknown brands. Mr. Roach was 
very candid in stating that he merely identified the last 
brand as the evidence of ownership when more than one 
brand existed and also admitted lack of actual knowledge 
regarding origin of the animals before inspection (Tr. 
80 and 81). With respect to the no brand animal, Mr. 
Roach didn't know the ownership, but relied on BOS-
WELL'S request for inspection as evidence of MOUNT 
NEBO ownership (Tr. 84 1. 6). Mr. Roach made no 
inspection for other brands, had no knowledge of the 
origin of the animals and used MOUNT NEBO as owner 
merely on the basis of the "V5" brand (Tr. 87 1. 5). The 
same kind of testimony applied to Exhibit 6, particularly 
cedificate 11212 therein, Exhibit 7, certificates numbered 
11261 and 11262, and Exhibit 8, particularly certificates 
11371 and 11377 (Tr. 99-104). 
A particularly interesting and telling circumstance is 
shown by the testimony referring to certificate 11377 in 
Exhibit 8. Although MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COM-
PANY is shown as owner at the top of the page, the 
certificate was signed by FIRST SECURITY, through 
RoyBroadbent, as owner at the time of inspection. Also 
in Exhibit 8 is certificate 11399, which shows FIRST 
SECURITY as owner in both places, even though the 
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cattle are branded "V5'\ The name FIRST SECURITY 
was ent red thereon at the request of Mr. Broadbemt and 
Mr. Re "h accepted such request as evidence of owner-
ship (Tr. 55 1. 14 and 56 1. 29). Those animals also had 
foreign brands in addition to the "V5", which were not 
identified and which carried no implication of ownership, 
the inspector again relying solely on the statement of 
the person requesting inspection as to the identity of 
the owner (Tr. 102 1. 5 and 108 1. 10). 
With request to Certificate 11378 in Exhibit 8, no 
"V5" brands were registered at all, but MOUNT NEBO 
CATTLE COMPANY was shown as owner as a result of 
the Certificates from Montana (Tr. 134 1. 7). The ques-
tion becomes more intriguing with reference to Exhibit 
13, Certificate 24342, Exhibit 14, Certificate 24380, Ex-
hibit 15, Certificate 24387, Exhibit 16, Certificate 24388 
and Exhibit 17, Certificate 11017. As to all of those ex-
hibits, J. B. J. was shown as owner, in reliance on the 
statements of the persons requesting inspection (Tr. 143-
148). 
Even the State Brand Inspector was willing to rely 
on extraneous statements rather than on the brands as 
evidence of ownership. Although such extraneous state-
ments themselves do not prove ownership, certainly it 
becomes painfully obvious that the existence of the brands 
are not evidence of ownership under these circumstances. 
Without unduly repeating previous references, we 
again cite the ciroimstiances concerning MR. BOSWELL's 
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use of the "V5" brand on the December 15 and December 
20 loads even before anyone made claim to the "V5" 
brand and before there was any determination regarding 
whether the cattle should be claimed by J. B. J. (in view 
of the refinancing with Producer's Livestock MR. BOS-
WELL was seeking) or would subsequently be claimed 
in a turn around of position by BOSWELL and MR. 
ALLEN to be cattle of the subsequently formed MOUNT 
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY. 
The Court has the most graphic presentation of all 
by viewing the photographs constituting Exhibits 19, 20, 
21 and 85, which show animals branded both "V5" and 
"(-)". Of all the evidence in the record, these photos 
show without question the indiscriminate use of the "V5" 
brand, even on animals which clearly and unquestion-
ably belonged to J. B. J. MR. BOSWELL claimed that 
the placing of the "V5" brand on those animals was in-
advertent and an accident, and that MOUNT NEBO 
made no claim for said animals (Tr. 388 1. 30). 
Further rebutting any presumption of ownership by 
reason of use of the "V5" brand is the testimony of Mr. 
Wallace Gardner, Senior Vice President of ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-respondent in this action. 
It was at his instance that the action was commenced, 
and his bank obviously had a stake in the controversy 
by reason of $50,000.00 on loan to intervener. The Court 
must keep in mind that MR. BOSWELL began using 
the "V5" brand on the December 15 load of animals 
approximately December 16, and it was not until the 
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meeting between BOSWELL, ALLEN and Gardner on 
New Year's Day, January 1, 1973, that plans were made 
for organizing MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY 
and financing that business through a loan at ZIONS. 
Thus, the original of the security agreement held by 
ZIONS, Exhibit 3, had no list of cattle attached as the 
language contemplated and no list was ever attached 
because they were to make the list as the invoices came 
in and the transactions in purchasing cattle were effected 
(Tr. 571 1. 19). The only record Mr. Gardner expected 
of the cattle covered by the security agreement would 
be the invoices which subsequently came in (Tr. 572 1. 
1). Mr. Gardner began receiving invoices during the 
third week of January, reflecting cattle purchased for 
MOUNT NEBO (Tr. 573 1. 6). The cattle belonging 
to MOUNT NEBO were not actually in existence on 
January 1, for they were to be purchased with the loan 
advances and MR. ALLEN's investment (Tr. 574 1. 12). 
Appellant urges strongly the conclusions which must 
be drawn from certain additional testimony. Having in 
mind that at least 74 head of cattle existed at the J. B. J. 
yards in Goshen, Utah to which intervenor and MOUNT 
NEBO CATTLE COMPANY subsequently made claim, 
we view with great interest the testimony of Mr. Gardner 
that no inspection of cattle was made by the bank in 
January, 1973 of any animals claimed by MOUNT NEBO, 
even when invoices began to arrive. We strongly urge 
that if intervenor on January 1, 1973 made claim to the 
74 head which had previously been branded "V5", this 
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fact would have been made known to Mr .Gardner, Mr. 
Gardner would have wanted to see the cattle or at least 
would have admitted that such cattle existed under 
MOUNT NEBO. To the contrary, however, he neither 
made an inspection nor was he even made aware that 
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY claimed any cat-
tle whatever existing in the State of Utah at that time. 
These facts strongly militate against any claim by in-
tervenor or plaintiff in this action that the 74 head com-
prising the December 15 and December 20 loads were to 
belong to MOUNT NEBO. 
We further assert that ZIONS BANK had knowledge 
of the disputes between FIRST SECURITY and J. B. J., 
and that Mr. Gardner knew of MR. BOSWELL's affilia-
tion with J. B. J. If ZIONS had intended to make any 
claim whatever to any cattle then existing in the J. B. J. 
yards at Goshen, the mos't natural reaction for a Senior 
Vice President of the bank with 35 years experience 
would have been to check out whether cattle so claimed 
were involved in the controversy between FIRST SE-
CURITY and J. B. J. Mr. Gardner knew that FIRST 
SECURITY had taken some action against BOSWELL 
prior to January 1, 1973 (Tr. 575 1. 24). Mr. Gardner 
knew that the MOUNT NEBO cattle, when purchased, 
would be headquartered at Goshen (Tr. 577 1. 1). On 
or about December 13, 1972, Mr. Gardner's office had 
received a letter from FIRST SECURITY (Exh. 45) 
cautioning ZIONS not to pay any further checks on the 
J. B. J. account, and it was common knowledge that 
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J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY were having difficulties 
(Tr. 6211. 22). With all of that knowledge by Mr. Gard-
ner, his actions were totally and diametrically opposed 
to any idea that either ZIONS or MOUNT NEBO would 
make claim of animals existing at that time in the J. B. J. 
yards at Goshen, and particularly the 74 head comprising 
the December 15 and December 20 loads. Notwithstand-
ing the "V5" brand on those cattle ,the Court must con-
clude that such cattle were not and are not the property 
of intervenor, and not subject to the lien of respondent. 
III. THE SECURITY AGREEMENT HELD 
BY ZIONS WAS EITHER INVALID 
OR DID NOT ATTACH TO THE ANI-
MALS IN QUESTION OR BOTH. 
Earlier comments in this brief have made it clear 
that the legal issue between ZIONS and FIRST SE-
CURITY does not involve conflicting priorities in the 
same collateral by reason of the same debtor's having 
granted two security interests. Either the cattle in dis-
pute were those of J. B. J. subject to FIRST SECUR-
ITY'S lien or they were cattle of intervenor subject to 
ZIONS' lien. Nevertheless, appellant argues that the po-
sition of ZIONS is substantially weakened with regard 
to a claim to any cattle, no matter what the other facts 
may be, by reason of serious defects in its documentation. 
The original promissory note held by ZIONS, shown 
as part of Exhibit 3, has only a minor defect in that the 
date of January 2 was changed by some unknown person 
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to January 3 (Tr. 566 1. 30). The security agreement, 
itself, constituting the balance of Exhibit 3, was executed 
before any livestock description was filled in because 
the cattle had not been purchased (Tr. 568 1. 23 and 570 
1. 11). The livestock description on the financing state-
ment was filled in later along with the security agreement 
(Tr. 571 1. 10). The original of the security agreement 
had no list of cattle attached and no list was ever at-
tached because the invoices representing purchases were 
to come in as the transactions were thereafter made (Tr. 
571 1. 19), and the only record the bank had would be 
the invoices which subsequently came, which constitute 
the list called for in the security agreement (Tr. 572 1. 
i ) . 
The typewritten portion of Paragraph 1 (a) of the se-
curity agreement shown as Exhibit 3 contains as the 
second sentence: "All livestock now owned or to be ac-
quired in the life of our contract." Yet, neither Mr. Gard-
ner (Tr. 572 1. 21) nor MR. ALLEN (Tr. 512 1. 25) had 
any understanding whatever of the life of the contract 
or the meaning thereof. Also, Mr. Gardner admitted 
that the cattle to be covered by the security agreement 
were not in existence on January 1, but were to be pur-
chased with the loan together with the investment of 
MOUNT NEBO (Tr. 574 1. 12). Such facts render 
completely meaningless the "now owned" language typed 
into the security agreement. Since the collateral de-
scribed in ZIONS security agreement was to be 200 
head as per list attached, and no list was ever attached, 
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except by incorporation through reference the invoices 
for cattle purchased and received three weeks later, the 
security agreement as of January 1, 1973 attached to 
nothing. 
The financing statement subsequently filed on Janu-
ary 29, 1973, after invoices started coming in for cattle 
claimed by MOUNT NEBO, has further serious docu-
mentary and legal defects. Section 70A-9-402 reads in 
part as follows: 
(1) "A financing statment is sufficient if it 
is signed by the debtor and the secured party, 
gives an address of the secured party from 
which information concerning the security in-
terest may be obtained, gives a mailing address 
of the debtor and contains a statement indicat-
ing the types, or describing the items, of col-
lateral." . . . 
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to 
comply with subsection (1): 
Name of debtor (or assignor) 
Address 
* * * " (emphasis supplied) 
It is clear that a financing statement requires the name 
of the debtor and the signature of the debtor. The Court 
will readily observe from a comparison of the pink financ-
ing statement copy, part of Exhibit 1 with the certified 
copy shown as Exhibit 2, that MOUNT NEBO CATTLE 
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COMPANY was named as debtor, but that the signa-
tures were those of DON ALLEN and LaDEAN S. 
ALLEN, individually, without reference to the identity 
of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMANY. Designation 
of an assumed business name or the name of a proprietor-
ship, without also designating the names of the indi-
vidual proprietors as debtors ,renders the financing state-
ment invalid and fails to comply with the provisions of 
§70A-9-402(l). The policy of the law on this point is 
rather obvious. Corporations and partnerships are legal 
entities made the subject of public records in the event 
any persons desiring to inquire wish to know of the prin-
cipal officers or partners. Proprietorships, however, con-
stitute only an assumed trade name adopted by one or 
more individuals for a business which must otherwise be 
accounted for entirely on the personal level. A financing 
statement on file showing MOUNT NEBO CATTLE 
COMPANY as debtor provides persons who wish to in-
quire with absolutely no information whatever regarding 
the nature of the entity . The Secretary of State indexes 
the financing statements under the name of the debtor 
shown in box number 1 on the financing statement. The 
presence of individual signatures at the bottom of the 
page only compounds the error rather than assisting it. 
Any potential creditors of DON ALLEN, for example, 
would have no way of determining whether or not his 
cattle in the State of Utah were subject to a security 
interest because the filed financing statement did not 
show. In an effort to correct that substantial deficiency, 
an additional financing statement was filed by ZIONS 
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some time later (Tr. 566 1. 6). At the critical time for 
this lawsuit, however, ZIONS had a defective financing 
statement. 
A rather persuasive precedent supporting the legal 
conclusion which appellant here urges on the facts re-
cited above, is in the matter of Matthew R. Leiehter, In-
dividually and d/b under the trade name and style of 
Landman Dry Cleaners, Bankrupt (C. C. A. 2d Cir. 1972, 
471 F. 2d 785). There it was held that a financing state-
ment showing the name of a proprietorship and a desig-
nation of "d/b/a" or the like was defective and invalid 
under the Commercial Code. 
Based on the foregoing, appellant asserts that respon-
dent ZIONS had no duly perfected security interest in 
any cattle ,whether MOUNT NEBO or otherwise, and 
particularly it had no security interest of sufficient val-
idity to permit it to make a claim against appellant for 
conversion of cattle as alleged in the complaint. 
IV. INTERVENOR AND RESPONDENT 
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BUR-
DEN OF PROOF WITH REGARD TO 
TITLE TO THE ANIMALS. 
In order to demonstrate the failure of intervenor 
and respondent to sustain the burden of proof regarding 
title to the animals, it is necessary to review certain ad-
ditional evidence (or lack thereof) for the benefit of the 
Court. Of most importance in this connection is the ab-
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solute lack of evidence in the record regarding shipments 
of cattle from Montana by DON ALLEN for the benefit 
of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY. Other than 
the claims to the much-disputed December 15 and Decem-
ber 20 loads, discussed at length earlier, and a few ex-
ceptional individual animals to which reference has been 
or will be made, the record contains no testimony and 
no documentary exhibits by which intervenor can show 
when, by whom and to whom animals were shipped for 
the benefit of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY. 
Intervenor cannot trace any of such animals into the 
so-called "attached animals" which are the very sub-
stance of this lawsuit. The most fatal defect in the case 
of intervenor and respondent, therefore, consists not in 
an analysis of existing evidence, but rather the total lack 
of supporting evidence. 
Commenting briefly on the few feeble attempts to 
tie in MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY animals 
with the exact animals in dispute, we proceed first to 
the testimony of MR. BOSWELL. Appellant candidly 
asserts that many many factors in the evidence tend 
to discredit the testimony of MR. BOSWELL. MR. 
BOSWELL testified that he had at no time any owner-
ship interest in MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY 
and did not invest money therein (Tr. 301 1. 4), yet MR. 
BOSWELL had previously testified under oath in an 
affidavit filed in a separate case, but introduced in this 
matter as Exhibit 26, that he was engaged in the business 
of buying and selling livestock and was doing business 
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in the name of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY 
(Paragraph 4, Exh. 26). He had no herds of his own for 
buying, selling or feeding (Tr. 330 1. 14). Notwithstand-
ing a brief reference to title to the MOUNT NEBO cat-
tle in DON ALLEN of Fairfield, Montana, the rest of 
the affidavit in Exhibit 26 contains no reference to MR. 
BOSWELL's supposed agency for DON ALLEN and 
all of the representations in that affidavit speak of MR. 
BOSWELL's business and a purported interference with 
his contractual relations with other persons or firms. 
These matters are typical of the inconsistencies in MR. 
BOSWELL's testimony. 
At the trial, MR. BOSWELL testified on a number 
of occasions that certain animals represented on the 
various brand inspection certificates introduced by Mr. 
Roach were cattle which belonged to MOUNT NEBO 
CATTLE COMPANY (See, generally, Tr. 304 through 
328, and, specifically, for example, Tr. 318 1. 5). Yet, 
MR. BOSWELL later admitted that during 1973 he sold 
approximately 5,000 head of cattle for MOUNT NEBO 
and purchased about 200 head (Tr. 331 1. 19), and it was 
obvious that he was primarily responsible for purchasing 
and selling approximately 3,200 head of cattle for J. B. J. 
during 1972 (Exh. 74). Most of said cattle were pur-
chased from Montana sources. Of the 5,000 MOUNT 
NEBO cattle, he had no idea of the identity of bulls, 
heifers, steers or cows, or the origin or sellers of the 
cattle (Tr. 339 1. 13, 340 1. 23). MR. BOSWELL had 
no knowledge of how many of the cattle were transferred 
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from one of DON ALLEN's other livestock companies. 
He recognized a few Montana brands, buit paid no at-
tention to the others (Tr. 341 1. 29 and 342 1. 5). MR. 
BOSWELL had no knowledge of the date and details 
of shipment and could not identify the animals in dis-
pute with any particular shipment or invoice coming 
from Montana or any particular purchase date with ref-
erence to the animals on Certificate 11157 (Tr. 344 1. 
20), Certificate 11186 (Tr. 357 1. 3), Certificate 11212 
(Tr. 357 1. 11), Certificate 11261 (Tr. 358 1. 28), Cer-
tificate 11262 (Tr. 361 1. 14), Certificate 11371 (Tr. 364 
1. 1), Certificate 11399 (Tr. 364 1. 26), Certificate 11377 
(Tr. 365 1. 29) and Exhibit 10 (Tr. 367 1. 9). MR. BOS-
WELL also stated that he could not clearly segregate 
any animals shipped in January, 1973, from those animals 
in the two loads of December 15 and December 20, 1972 
(Tr. 358 1. 28). 
MR. BOSWELL had agreed with the FORDS to 
purchase the interests of the FORDS in J. B. J. FEED-
YARDS, INC., and claimed after December 27, that the 
J. B. J. FEED YARDS properties in Goshen were under 
his personal control (Tr. 380 1. 23). Yet, he admitted 
that no payment was ever made by him on the pur-
ported December 20 agreement for purchase of the 
FORDS' interests (Tr. 379 1. 22). MR. BOSWELL was 
not only a 50% stockholder of J. B. J., but was a vice 
president and director (Tr. 300 1. 2), and even when 
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY was organized, 
he continued to be an officer and employee thereof (Tr. 
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334 1. 23) and never did cease being an agent for J. B. J. 
(Tr. 460 1. 4). MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY 
did not have possession of the J. B. J. FEEDYARDS 
(Tr. 433 1. 28), even during the disputed December 15 
and December 20 shipments. 
MR. BOSWELL testified that he supervised and 
participated in an inventory of animals at the J. B. J. 
properties in Goshen on December 27, 1972, for the pur-
pose of establishing values as the foundation for his 
consummation of the purchase of the FORDS' interests 
in J. B. J. Many other individuals also participated in 
that inventory, which counted only the J. B. J. and 
separated out cattle belonging to others. MR. BOSWELL 
estimated that 1,200 head of cattle were present on that 
inventory date, of which approximately 400 bead be-
longed to Mike Hatch (Tr. 351 1. 27). Thai left approxi-
mately 800 head of J. B. J. cattle, which was consistent 
with what should have been there based on the other 
records of J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY. MR. BOS-
WELL subsequently attempted to change his testimony, 
after a Court recess and consultation with counsel, for 
later he said only 400 or 500 animals belonging to J. B. J. 
were present on December 27 (Tr. 378 1. 1). Apparently, 
the witness was reminded that his earlier response would 
be damaging to the case of intervener, and thus his esti-
mates in the later testimony reduced the number of 
J. B. J. cattle by approximately the number of cattle 
in dispute. This is a rather clear effort on the part of 
MR. BOSWELL to twist the facts for the benefit of in-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
56 
tervenor and respondent, and we assert that his earlier 
candid response which would result in 800 J. B. J. ani-
mals of December 27, 1972 is most reliable, particularly 
since it is confirmed by the other testimony and records. 
MR. BOSWELL had earlier attempted to rehabili-
tate the portion of MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COM-
PANY by using MOUNT NEBO invoices to reflect sales 
of the cattle from the Lazy S Cattle Company yards 
which had been the subject of the sheriff's attachment. 
He admitted that he used the MOUNT NEBO form, 
even with the understanding that cattle were being sold 
pursuant to the stipulation and agreement which appears 
as Exhibit 93 (Tr. 416 1.1). The invoice numbers in 
Exhibit 11 were originally described as MOUNT NEBO 
invoices, but the designation was changed to reflect sales 
from Lazy S prior to appellant's agreement to have that 
exhibit introduced in evidence as a summary of sales of 
the disputed animals (See, generally, MR. BOSWELL's 
testimony with regard to the invoices, Tr. 416 through 
423, and, particularly, his admission that the MOUNT 
NEBO form was for his own records, even for sales han-
dled by or for other people, Tr. 421 1. 2 and 423 1. 27). 
MR. ALLEN also attempted to designate through 
very general testimony that the animals which he in-
spected at the Lazy S Cattle Company yards on Febru-
ary 9, 1973 were animals which he had purchased in 
Montana, thus attempting to identify them as MOUNT 
NEBO animals (Tr. 493 1. 5 and 494 1. 27). Yet, he 
admitted that he sold 20,000 or 25,000 cattle during the 
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year 1972 and could not tell whether any brands which 
he recognized on specific cattle pertained to cattle shipped 
from Montana prior to January 1, 1973 (Tr. 509 1. 11 
and 510 1. 19). With reference to each of the animals 
which he recognized as being purchased from a neighbor, 
a friend or otherwise an identifiable source, he could not 
tell whether such animals were part of the shipments 
prior to January 1, 1973, thus making them J, B. J. ani-
mals very clearly, or were shipped subsequent to that 
time either as J. B. J. or as MOUNT NEBO cattle (Tr, 
520 1. 2 and 521 1. 22). Since MR. ALLEN was not 
present during any of the branding of animals in Utah, 
he could not recognize a MOUNT NEBO animal, other 
than the feet that the "V5" brand had been placed on 
some animals (Tr. 522 1. 21). 
It is evident that any attempt to identify specific 
animals through memory, with a failure to present docu-
mentary evidence regarding animals shipped for the 
claimed ownership of MOUNT NEBO, renders a l of the 
testimony on behalf of intervenor and respondent totally 
unreliable with regard to ownership. MR. ALLEN and 
his counsel had ample opportunity to present the rec-
ords documenting sales from any Montana source to 
MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY, but utterly 
failed to provide any meaningful records for the benefit 
of the Court. The oral testimony regarding ownership 
was so unreliable, as evidenced by the examples of testi-
mony discussed above, that this Court has no reasonable 
alternative, but to declare unsupported by the evidence 
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the findings of the lower Court regarding ownership by 
intervener and to reverse the lower Court's judgment. 
In further support of that argument, appellant made 
a record in the lower Court which demonstrates rather 
convincingly that the reason for intervener's failure to 
provide documentary evidence in support of his alleged 
chain of title is the fact that the documentary evidence 
would not support his claim. After some discussion be-
tween Court, counsel and appellant's witness, Mr. Broad-
bent, Exhibit 86 was received into evidence (Tr. 864 1. 
5). That exhibit represents all of the records which 
appellant was able to obtain from intervenor and respon-
dent relating to shipments by MOUNT NEBO CATTLE 
COMPANY of cattle into Utah from the period January 
1, 1973 through February 7, 1973, the date prior to physi-
cal possession by the sheriff and subsequent taking of 
cattle in dispute to the Lazy S Cattle Company yards. 
The proposition is that if the attached cattle here in 
dispute, were, in fact, cattle belonging to MOUNT NEBO, 
then through use of MOUNT NEBO's invoices for the 
period prior to the attachment, we should be able to 
trace the Montana brands and determine whether those 
brands appeared on the attached cattle. If not, the cat-
tle did not belong to MOUNT NEBO. Appellant made 
a painstaking search, comparison and analysis of the 
brands on cattle which were clearly those of MOUNT 
NEBO described in Exhibit 86, compared with the so-
called "foreign" or "Montana" brands on all of the brand 
inspections pertaining to the cattle in dispute, most of 
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which are summarized on Exhibit 11. Out of the 267 
head taken pursuant to the attachment, only 12 possible 
duplications of brands exist. This means that at the 
very least, 255 of the attached animals in dispute were 
clearly not those of MOUNT NEBO. It is the assertion 
of appellant that even the 12 animals bearing similar 
brands cannot unequivocally be identified as MOUNT 
NEBO. DON ALLEN may have purchased animals 
with a certain brand for shipment to J. B. J. in 1972 and 
purchased additional animals with the same brand or 
brands for shipment to MOUNT NEBO in 1973. Because 
of all of the circumstances asserted in this brief on behalf 
of appellant, such animals would be declared under the 
ownership of J. B. J. subject to appellant's lien. 
To aid the Court in its analysis, we will briefly de-
scribe the 12 animals shown on Exhibit 86, which have 
brands in common with those shown on Exhibit 11 or 
other exhibits supporting Exhibit 11 and describing the 
animals in dispute sold from the Lazy S yards. 
(1) Exhibit 87 is Fred Diamond's inspection cer-
tificate of April 16,1973 for some of the cattle in the Lazy 
S property. One animal carried a brand which is a Bar 
Lazy SZ which is similar to a brand also shown on market 
clearance certificate 467504, part of Exhibit 86. 
(2) On Exhibit 10, a Myles Roach inspection cer-
tificate, occurs one animal with a A/B, similar to a brand 
shown on Montana market clearance 469366, part of Ex-
hibit 86. 
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(3) Exhibit 89 is the brand inspection certificate 
of Mr. R. C. Sessions pertaining to cattle sold out of the 
Lazy S yards on April 11, 1973, with specific reference to 
Mr. Sessions' Certificate 1647. Ten animals there re-
flected bear brands similar to brands on MOUNT NEBO 
invoices made part of Exhibit 86. One animal shows a 
K4 which is similar to a brand shown on Montana live-
stock certificate 410726, Exh. 86. 
(4) (5) (6) Three animals on Mr. Sessions' cer-
tificate bear an A with what appears to be an s to the 
lower right, a brand similar to a brand shown on Certifi-
cate 426042 on Exhibit 86. 
(7) There is a J with a little figure on the right on 
Mr. Sessions' certificate which appears to correspond with 
one animal of similar brand on Montana certificate 
373082, Exhibit 86. 
(8) One animal with an R and a plus sign and 
what appears to be a 3 in Mr. Sessions' certificate ap-
pears similar to a brand on Montana certificate 464336, 
a part of Exhibit 86. 
(9) (10) Two animals bearing an S with a curved 
bar underneath are similar to a brand on Montana cer-
tificate 469305, Exhibit 86. 
(11) A brand appearing to be EP is similar to a 
brand on Montana certificate 464336, Exhibit 86. 
(12) Finally, one animal with an LL with a curved 
bar underneath appears in Mr. Sessions' certificate simi-
lar to a brand in Montana certificate 41076, Exhibit 86. 
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With respect to all other animals under the attach-
ment and in dispute in this case, no Montana brands 
appear on those animals which duplicate any brands on 
animals originating in Montana and purchased by DON 
ALLEN for MOUNT NEBO CATTLE COMPANY as 
reflected in Exhibit 86. 
CONCLUSION 
1. J. B. J. and FIRST SECURITY have demon-
strated that all of the cattle in question, enumerated in 
Findings 15,16,18,19, 20, 21 and 22, are caittle purchased 
by J. B. J. and made subject to the lien of FIRST SE-
CURITY; 
2. Iiutervenor and Respondent have failed to sustain 
any burden of proof whatever with regard to title to the 
animals; 
3. This Court is both empowered and required to re-
verse tihe Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the Trial 
Judge, who sat without a jury, and should require the 
entry of new Findings, Conclusions and Judgment award-
ing the disputed cattle and proceeds thereof to J. B, J., 
subject to the security interest of FIRST SECURITY; 
4. This Court should further order that the proceeds 
held by the Clerk of the lower Court and obtained by In-
tervenor and Respondent in the amount of $34,127.18 must 
be returned to FIRST SECURITY and that FIRST SE-
CURITY may also apply to the outstanding indebtedness 
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of J. B. J. the additional funds it holds representing pro-
ceeds of the disputed cattle; 
5. Oos/ts should be awarded to Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON B. ALLEN of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
V. PERSHING NELSON of 
ALDRICH & NELSON 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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